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CAN STUDENTS SUE WHEN SCHOOLS DON'T MAKE
THE GRADE? THE WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT OF
STUDENT LEARNING AND EDUCATIONAL
MALPRACTICE
Rebecca R. Glasgow
Abstract: Washington's Academic Achievement and Accountability Statute (AAA
Statute) creates a statewide system of school accountability. It also requires that all students
pass the tenth-grade level of the Washington Assessment of Student Learning standardized
test (WASL) to receive a diploma. Unfortunately, when this graduation requirement takes
effect in 2008, many students will not receive diplomas because they will be unable to pass
the WASL before graduation. Some of these students will have met all local graduation
requirements, so the only graduation requirement they will not be able to meet will be the
statewide requirement that they pass the WASL. Their WASL failure will show that their
school districts failed to educate them to statewide standards either by inadequately
instructing them or by allowing them to pass local assessments even though they lacked
essential skills. This Comment explores the viability of educational malpractice claims against
school districts for compensatory damages for remedial education when students are denied
diplomas based only on failing WASL scores. Such claims, based on the AAA Statute, should
succeed under the Washington Supreme Court's most recent test for determining the existence
of an implied private statutory cause of action. These claims should also overcome other legal
and policy barriers that have led Washington and other state courts to reject educational
malpractice causes of action.
Shelby' has attended public school in the same school district since
kindergarten. Although her grades have rarely been above average, she
has never failed a grade or a class. When Shelby took the Washington
Assessment of Student Learning standardized test (WASL) in her tenth-
grade year, she passed only the reading and listening sections, failing the
math and writing sections. Shelby's failure shows that, even though she
met local graduation requirements, she did not acquire the skills
necessary to meet statewide standards. Beginning in 2008, students like
Shelby, who cannot pass the WASL before graduation, will not receive a
diploma.
The WASL is a result of Washington's extensive attempts to improve
the quality of its public education system. The Washington Legislature
passed the Academic Achievement and Accountability Statute (AAA
1. Hypothetical created by the author for illustrative purposes.
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Statute) in 1999.2 This statute creates both a statewide requirement that
all students pass the tenth-grade WASL before graduation3 and a
statewide accountability system for schools that fail to produce students
who can pass the WASL.4 Washington's public5 high school class of
2008 must pass all sections 6 of the tenth-grade WASL to receive a
diploma.' In the 1999-2000 school year, eighty percent of the state's
tenth graders failed at least one section.' Given these failure rates, a large
percentage of students in the class of 2008 is likely to meet all local
requirements 9 yet be unable to pass the WASL before the 2008
graduation date.'°
2. Ch. 388, 1999 Wash. Laws 2142-43 (codified in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 28A.300, .320, .630, .655).
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.060(3)(c) (2000).
4. Id. § 28A.655.060(3)(i)(i).
5. Although the legislature did not specifically explain its reasoning, the graduation requirement
does not apply to private school students. Id. § 28A. 195 010(6). "The legislature hereby recognizes
that private schools should be subject only to those minimum state controls necessary to insure the
health and safety of all the students in the state and to insure a sufficient basic education to meet
usual graduation requirements." Id. § 28A. 195.010.
6. The Superintendent of Public Instruction must craft the following additional sections before the
graduation requirement takes effect in 2008: Science, Social Studies, Art, and Health. Id.
§ 28A.655.060(3)(b)(iii).
7. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 180-51-063 (2000). The General Educational Development (GED)
credential will probably continue to be an alternative assessment and credential for students who do
not receive a high school diploma. Telephone Interview with Rosemary Fitton, Coordinator for
Special Projects, Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction (Apr. 3, 2001). However, GED
recipients generally earn less money, experience higher job turnover, and attain less postsecondary
education than high school graduates. DAVID BOESEL ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: EDUCATIONAL
AND LABOR MARKET PERFORMANCE OF GED RECIPIENTS 6-7 (U.S. Dept. of Education 1998).
8. Keith Ervin, Only 1 in 4 Pass Entire 4th-Grade State Test, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at
Al.
9. For example, the Tahoma School District requires that students pass twenty-two credits
including specific courses in Language Arts, Math, Science, Social Studies, Physical Education, Fine
Arts, and Occupational Education. TAHOMA SCH. DIST., 2000-2001 TAHOMA SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL
COURSE CATALOG 7 (2000).
10. Students will probably have several chances to pass the Washington Assessment of Student
Learning test (WASL) between their tenth-grade year and their expected graduation date. Telephone
Interview with Rosemary Fitton, Coordinator for Special Projects, Office of the Superintendent of
Public Instruction (Apr. 3, 2001). Remediation services will probably be provided to students who
were unable to pass the WASL on their first attempt. Id. However, some educators have expressed
concern that many students in the class of 2008 who scored poorly on their fourth grade WASL will
be unable to pass the tenth-grade WASL by graduation. Hunter T. George, Delay New Requirements
for Diplomas, Lawmakers Told, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at B4. Furthermore, sixteen is both
the legal dropout age in Washington and the age at which students will first learn of their tenth-grade
test results. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.225.010(l)(e), 28A.655.060(3)(c) (2000). Students who
fail the test may drop out, believing they will not receive a diploma.
Educational Malpractice
Should students who meet all local graduation requirements, but fail
to pass the WASL, recover compensatory damages from their school
district to pay for remedial education?" Student suits for educational
malpractice may arise when a school district fails to educate students to
WASL standards by inadequately instructing them or by allowing them
to pass local assessments even though they lack essential skills.'" In order
to establish a successful claim for educational malpractice based on a
state statute that contains no express cause of action, a plaintiff must
show that a cause of action was implied by the law. 3 In addition, courts
have traditionally insisted that plaintiffs show a workable standard of
care against which a court could measure school performance, a concrete
and assessable harm, and a causal connection between the school
district's failure and the injury claimed. 4 Finally, the plaintiff must
overcome traditional policy barriers, including hesitation to interfere
with the daily judgment of school officials 5 and fear of opening
floodgates of litigation against school districts. 6
This Comment argues that students in the class of 2008 and beyond
who are denied a diploma solely because they are unable to pass the
WASL should be able to sue their school district and recover
compensatory damages for educational malpractice under the AAA
Statute. Part I describes the AAA Statute, which creates both the
graduation requirement and a system through which the state evaluates
school performance based on its students' WASL scores. Part II outlines
the test that Washington courts use to determine whether an implied
individual cause of action exists under a state statute. Part III describes
traditional law and policy shields that courts have used to protect school
districts from educational malpractice causes of action. Part IV argues
that the AAA Statute creates an implied private cause of action for
individual students and that those students should also be able to
11. Any aggrieved party may maintain an action against a school district for an injury arising out
of a district's act or omission. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.08.110-.120 (2000).
12. A student may choose to sue the State of Washington under a variety of other theories
including a challenge to the validity of the WASL test. Such claims are outside the scope of this
Comment.
13. See Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 52 Wash. App. 531, 536, 762 P.2d 356, 360 (1988).
14. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976).
15. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y. 1979).
16. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
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overcome traditional legal and policy barriers to educational malpractice
claims.
I. THE AAA STATUTE CREATES A SYSTEM THAT
MEASURES STUDENT PERFORMANCE AND HOLDS
SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE FOR STUDENT LEARNING
The Washington State Constitution mandates that the state fund basic
education for all children in Washington, but the Washington Supreme
Court has not interpreted the mandate to require that public education
rise to a particular level of adequacy.' 7 However, since the early 1990s
the Washington State Legislature has been developing a system of school
accountability that relies on statewide standardized tests. The AAA
Statute measures school performance by the WASL scores and holds
school districts accountable for student failure as measured by those
scores.'8 Furthermore, the AAA Statute requires that all students pass the
tenth-grade WASL as a prerequisite for graduation.' 9
A. The Washington Constitution Supports the AAA Framework by
Creating a Student Right to a Public Education
Article IX of the Washington Constitution establishes a student right
to a public education."° It declares that the state has a "paramount duty"
to make "ample provision for the education of all children" by creating a
"general and uniform system of public schools."'" The Washington
Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that the state must
sufficiently fund the public school system.22  Furthermore, the
"paramount duty" language of Article IX imposes a judicially-
enforceable affirmative state duty to provide a public education." That
duty creates a "correlative right" for all Washington children to receive a
17. WASH. CONsT. art. IX, §§ 1-2; Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476,482, 585 P.2d 71,
76(1978).
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.060(3)(i)(iii) (2000).
19. Id. § 28A.655.060(3)(c).
20. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that education is not a fundamental right, a student's
right to public education must be based on a state constitution. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
21. WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-2.
22. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 518, 585 P.2d at 95.
23. Id. at 482, 585 P.2d at 76.
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public education.2' Recently, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed
that all children have a "constitutionally paramount" right arising out of
the state's duty to make ample provision for the education of all
children.2'
B. The Washington State Legislature Has Progressively Developed
Both a Statewide Graduation Requirement and a System of School
Accountability Based on Student Test Performance
Since 1992, the legislature has progressively amended education
statutes, making schools increasingly accountable for student
performance. In 1992 and 1993, the legislature made significant
amendments to Washington's education statutes.26 The amendments laid
the framework for the current AAA Statute by emphasizing specific
school district duties and corresponding school accountability.27
The 1992 amendment created only a basic plan for developing an
accountability system.28 The legislature found a need to increase student
accomplishment by holding "schools accountable for their performance
based on what students learn., 29 The statute created the Washington
Commission on Student Learning (WCSL),30 charged with both
identifying what elementary and secondary school students need to know
and developing an assessment system to measure those skills.3" The
assessment system32 would be used as a tool for measuring student
achievement, evaluating instructional practices, and initiating academic
24. Id.
25. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash. 2d 201,221, 5 P.3d 691, 702 (2000). One commentator has
suggested that an educational malpractice plaintiff might be able to state a claim based on the
Washington Constitution. See Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing:
Defining the Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L REV. 399, 419 (2000).
However, Washington courts have denied attempts to establish such a claim. Id. at 418-19.
26. Performance-Based Education Act, ch. 141, 1992 Wash. Laws 574; Education Reform-
Improvement of Student Achievement Act, ch. 336, 1993 Wash. Laws 1293.
27. See Performance-Based Education Act, ch. 141, § 302(1), 1992 Wash. Laws 581; Education
Reform-Improvement of Student Achievement Act, ch. 336, § 202(3)(i), 1993 Wash. Laws 1299.
28. See Performance-Based Education Act, ch. 141, § 202, 1992 Wash. Laws 578-79.
29. Ch. 141, § 1, 1992 Wash. Laws 574.
30. Ch. 141, § 202(2), 1992 Wash. Laws 578.
31. Ch. 141, §§ 202(5)(a)-(b), 1992 Wash. Laws 578-79.
32. The Superintendent of Public Instruction eventually developed the WASL to serve as the
assessment tool. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.030(1)(b) (2000).
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support for students who did not master essential skills." The
amendment also declared that students must pass the high-school-level
345assessment" to receive a certificate of mastery,35 which will become a
statewide requirement for graduation in 2008.36 Thus, the 1992 law laid
the foundation for a statewide graduation requirement and a school
accountability system.
The 1993 amendment added more specific structure to the
accountability system. It set deadlines for the development of both
"essential academic learning requirements"3 7 and the statewide student
assessment system.38 The legislature also specified that the certificate of
mastery needed for graduation should be attainable by age sixteen.39
Finally, the amendment required the WCSL to develop assistance
programs for schools whose students fail the statewide assessment and a
state intervention system to hold consistently failing schools
accountable.4" These amendments reflect the early development of
Washington's school accountability and student assessment systems.
33. Ch. 141, § 202(5)(b), 1992 Wash. Laws 578-79.
34. The tenth-grade WASL now serves as the high-school-level assessment. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 28A.655.030(1)(b); Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Assessment,
Research, & Curriculum, at http://www.kl2.wa.us/assessmentWASLintro.asp (last visited July 31,
2001).
35. Ch. 141, § 202(5)(c), 1992 Wash. Laws 579.
36. In 1992, the legislature mandated no implementation date for the graduation requirement. See
id. The Superintendent of Public Instruction promulgated the 2008 implementation date in WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 180-51-063(2)(a) (2000).
37. Education Reform-Improvement of Student Achievement Act, ch. 336, § 202(3)(a), 1993
Wash. Laws 1296. The essential academic learning requirements are very specific benchmarks based
on the following general learning goals:
[T]o provide opportunities for all students to develop the knowledge and skills essential to: (1)
Read with comprehension, write with skill, and communicate effectively and responsibly in a
variety of ways and settings; (2) Know and apply the core concepts and principles of
mathematics; social, physical, and life sciences; civics and history; geography; arts; and health
and fitness; (3) Think analytically, logically, and creatively, and to integrate experience and
knowledge to form reasoned judgments and solve problems; and (4) Understand the importance
of work and how performance, effort, and decisions directly affect future career and educational
opportunities.
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A. 150.210. See also Essential Academic Leaming Requirements, at
http://www.k 12.wa.us/reform/EALR/standards/ealrshort.asp (last visited July 31, 2001).
38. Ch. 336, § 202(3)(b), 1993 Wash. Laws 1296-97.
39. Ch. 336, § 202(3)(c), 1993 Wash. Laws 1298.
40. Ch. 336, §§ 202(3)(h)(ii)-(iii) 1993 Wash. Laws 1299.
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C. The Current AAA Statute Completes the Development of
Washington's Assessment and Accountability Systems
In 1999, the legislature passed the current AAA Statute,4 which
retains the salient features of the 1992 and 1993 laws.42 The new law
consolidates existing accountability statutes, amends past assessment and
accountability systems, and adds additional detail.43 The current AAA
Statute creates a stricter, more focused accountability structure based on
WASL scores.
The statute reveals a specific legislative purpose to protect the
educational opportunities of individual students. The purpose of
Washington's accountability system is to improve student learning so
that "each individual student" has the opportunity to develop the skills
necessary to become a responsible and successful citizen.44 Furthermore,
the legislature based the accountability system on the "fundamental
principle" that all public school students should have access to
curriculum and instruction aligned with state standards.45
The AAA statute delegates duties to both the state Superintendent of
Public Instruction (SPI), and a new state commission. The statute
requires that the SPI maintain and continue to develop the statewide
assessment system, the WASL, which students now take in the fourth,
seventh, and tenth grades.46 The tenth-grade WASL is the high school
level assessment that students must pass to receive a diploma.47 The
statute also creates an Academic Achievement and Accountability
Commission (A+ Commission)4" whose primary purpose is to oversee
the state accountability system.49 The A+ Commission must identify
schools and school districts "in which significant numbers of students
41. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.655.005-.902; Ch. 388, 1999 Wash. Laws 2142.
42. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.655.060(3)(c), .060(3)(i) (retaining accountability system and
graduation requirements).
43. See K-12 Accountability Act, ch. 388, 1999 Wash. Laws 2142; Student Assessments Act, ch.
373, § 501, 1999 Wash. Laws 1904.
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.005.
45. Id. The state standards are the Essential Academic Learning Requirements. See supra note 37.
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.070(3).
47. Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Assessment, Research, & Curriculum, at
http:llwww.kl2.wa.us/assessmentWASLintro.asp (last visited July 31, 2001).
48. The A+ Commission replaced the WCSL WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.900(I).
49. Id. § 28A.655.020(2).
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persistently fail to meet state standards,"5 using WASL scores to
evaluate school district performance."' The A+ Commission must also
develop a system for state intervention in identified schools.5 2 The
ultimate goal of education reform in Washington is a statewide school
accountability system that uses WASL scores to evaluate school
performance.
Finally, as required by the legislature, 3 the SPI has created regulations
for AAA implementation. 4 The 2007-08 school year is the first year in
which high school seniors must have a state certificate of mastery to
graduate." Therefore, children who are in the sixth grade during the
2001-02 school year will not graduate in 2008, even if they meet all
local graduation requirements, unless they pass all sections of the tenth-
grade WASL. 6 However, the AAA Statute contains neither a remedial
provision, nor an express cause of action, for students who are denied
diplomas based on failing WASL scores.
II. WASHINGTON'S TEST FOR IMPLYING A STATUTORY
PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION IS MORE FAVORABLE TO
PLAINTIFFS THAN THE FEDERAL TEST
A student seeking redress for a denied diploma based on a failing
WASL score should be able to establish an implied cause of action under
the AAA Statute. To determine the existence of an implied private cause
of action under a statute, the Washington Supreme Court uses a test first
articulated in Bennett v. Hardy." The court initially modeled its analysis
after the U.S. Supreme Court's Cort v. Ash test. Although federal courts
have since become reluctant to allow implied private causes of action
50. Id. § 28A.655.030(l)(d).
51. Id. § 28A.655.035(1)(b).
52. Id. § 28A.655.060(3)(i)(iii). The A+ Commission has recommended interventions including
withholding of funds, reorganization of district personnel, removal of schools from district
jurisdiction, abolition or restructuring of school districts, and authorization of student transfers.
WASHINGTON STATE ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY COMMISSION,
Accountability System Recommendations 5 (Nov. 2000). The Washington Legislature had not passed
these suggested interventions into law as of July 31, 2001.
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.070(3).
54. See. e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 180-51-063 (2000).
55. Id. § 180-51-063.
56. Id. § 180-51-063; see also supra note 10.
57. 113 Wash. 2d 912, 920-21, 784 P.2d 1258, 1261-62 (1990).
58. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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under federal statutes, the Washington Supreme Court evaluates state
causes of action more favorably to plaintiffs. This divergence is due to
the Washington court's refusal to isolate legislative intent as the sole
consideration in determining whether a cause of action exists under a
state statute.59 In fact, the court presumes that the legislature is aware of
the doctrine of implied statutory causes of action, thereby finding a cause
of action when the legislature is silent on the subject."'
A. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Narrowed the Cort Test for
Determining the Existence of Implied Federal Statutory Causes of
Action
In 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court applied a four-factor test to
determine the existence of an implied private cause of action under a
federal statute." The Court asked whether Congress created the statute
for the plaintiffs special benefit, whether Congress explicitly or
implicitly indicated an intent to create or deny a private remedy, and
whether allowing the plaintiff a private remedy was consistent with the
statute's underlying purpose.62 Finally, the Court determined whether the
action was one traditionally relegated to state law, thus making a federal
implied cause of action inappropriate.63
In subsequent cases, the Court narrowed the test by reducing it to a
primary consideration of legislative intent.' For example, in Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington,65 the Court treated the question of legislative
intent as controlling.66 Because Congress was silent as to the existence of
an implied private cause of action, the Court refused to find one.67 Two
years later, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
59. Bennett, 113 Wash. 2d at 920-21,784 P.2d at 1261-62.
60. Tyner v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Serv., 141 Wash. 2d 68, 80, 1 P.3d 1148, 1155 (2000)
(quoting Bennett, 113 Wash. 2d at 919-20,784 P.2d at 1261 (quoting McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wash. 2d
265,274, 621 P.2d 1285, 1290 (1980) (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting))).
61. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76
WASH. L. REv. 67,87-88 (2001).
65. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
66. id. at 568.
67. Id. at 571.
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Clammers Ass'n,65 the Court stated that it must consider statutory
language and legislative history to determine legislative intent. 69 Because
the statute in Middlesex provided other remedies and the court found no
intent to provide a private damages claim, the Court held there was no
implied statutory private cause of action for damages.7' Based on this
strict test, federal courts rarely find an implied private right of action
under a federal statute.
B. The Washington Supreme Court's Bennett Test More Readily
Permits Plaintiffs To Establish Implied Causes ofAction Under
Washington Statutes
In Bennett v. Hardy,71 the Washington Supreme Court articulated its
test for determining whether an implied cause of action exists under a
state statute.72 The court retained the first three factors of the Cort test,
73
but, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, it did not require any affirmative
legislative intent to create a private cause of action. Thus, it considered
(1) whether the plaintiff was one for whose "special benefit" the statute
was created; (2) whether legislative intent explicitly or implicitly
supported creating or denying a remedy; and (3) whether implying a
remedy was consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation.74
Most significantly, legislative silence as to the presence or absence of a
private cause of action did not preclude such an action.75 The court
reasoned that when a statute has created a right by requiring certain
conduct, a court should devise a remedy for injured persons though the
statute specifies none.76 Therefore, a plaintiff can more easily establish an
individual private cause of action under a Washington statute than under
a federal statute.
68. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
69. Id. at 13.
70. Id. at 13-14.
71. 113 Wash. 2d 912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990).
72. Id. at 920-21, 784 P.2d at 1261-62.
73. The fourth factor of the Cori test, determining whether action is traditionally relegated to state
law, is not relevant to state claims. Id. at 921 n.3, 784 P.2d at 1261 n.3.
74. Id. at 920-21,784 P.2d at 1261-62.
75. Id. at 919-20, 784 P.2d at 1261.
76. Id. at 920, 784 P.2d at 1261 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (1979)).
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In Tyner v. State Department of Social & Health Services,7 7 the
Washington Supreme Court applied the Bennett test to Washington's
Child Abuse Statute. If the Department of Social and Health Services
(DSHS) receives a report of suspected child abuse, it must investigate,
issue a report, and, when necessary, refer such a report to the court.78 The
Tyner court held that the Child Abuse Statute provided an implied
private cause of action for a father who suffered lack of contact with his
children resulting from negligent investigation by DSHS officials.79
First, the court reasoned that the purpose section of the statute
established accused parents as part of the class for whose special benefit
the statute was created.8" The statutory language emphasized the
importance of the bond between parent and child, stating that any
intervention into a child's life is also an intervention into the parent's."
Therefore, the plaintiff met the first prong of the Bennett test. 2 Second,
the court found that the legislature supported implying a remedy.
Notwithstanding that the statute and legislative history were "silent as to
this point,"" the court presumed the legislature was "aware of the
doctrine of implied statutory causes of action."85 The court concluded
that by recognizing the deep importance of the parent-child relationship,
the legislature intended a judicial remedy for parents if the DSHS
invaded that interest.86 Finally, the court held that an implied cause of
action for damages for parents was consistent with the underlying
purpose of the Child Abuse Statute. The Child Abuse Statute has two
purposes: to protect children and to preserve the integrity of the family.88
Although the state argued that a cause of action for accused parents
77. 141 Wash. 2d 68, 1 P.3d 1148 (2000).
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.050 (2000).
79. Tyner, 141 Wash. 2d at 82, 1 P.3d at 1155.
80. Id. at 78, 1 P.3d at 1154.
81. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.010 (2000)).
82. Id. at 80, 1 P.3d at 1154.
83. Id. at 80, 1 P.3d at 1154-55.
84. Id. at 80, 1 P.3d at 1155.
85. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 919-20, 784 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1990)
(quoting McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wash. 2d 265, 274, 621 P.2d 1285, 1290 (1980) (Brachtenbach, J.,
dissenting.))).
86.Id.
87. Id.
88.Id.
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would create conflicting caseworker responsibilities,89 the court found
that the statute creates a hierarchy of interests and that hierarchy allows
for accomplishment of both purposes.9" Therefore, finding all three
prongs of the Bennett test satisfied, the court held that under the Child
Abuse Statute the DSHS owes a duty of care to parent suspects when
investigating allegations of child abuse.91
Justice Talmadge and two other Justices dissented, complaining that
the majority failed to discuss the procedural protections for accused
parents defined in the Child Abuse Statute.92 The dissent argued that the
legislature did not create a private cause of action because procedural
protections-including written notification of allegations and
investigative findings, opportunity for written response, agency review,
and adjudicative hearings-all safeguarded parents93 while recognizing
that the primary goal of the statute was to ensure protection of abused
children.94 Accordingly, no general duty should exist towards accused
parents,95 but only a specific duty to follow the statute's procedural
provisions." Furthermore, the dissent argued that a general duty would
create a conflict for investigators because sensitivity to parental interests
would deter caseworkers from aggressively investigating child abuse.9 7
Therefore, the dissenting justices concluded that the legislature did not
intend to create an implied statutory private cause of action for parents. 98
Tyner is the Washington Supreme Court's most recent determination
of the existence of an implied statutory private cause of action. The court
continues to consider Bennett's three factors and presumes the legislature
89. Id. at 81, 1 P.3d at 1155. The state argued that the duty to protect children from abusers and
the duty to protect parents from being falsely accused created conflicting responsibilities. Id.
90. Id. at 79, 1 P.3d at 1154.
91. Id. at 82, 1 P.3d at 1155.
92. Id. at 93, 1 P.3d at 1161 (Talmadge, J., dissenting). Justices Guy and Smith joined the dissent.
Id. at 89, 1 P.3d at 1159. Although the majority in Tyner did not discuss procedural protections, the
Washington Supreme Court noted in an earlier case that a court should not find an implied cause of
action where the statute has provided an adequate remedy. Cazzanigi v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 132
Wash. 2d 433, 445, 938 P.2d 819, 825 (1997).
93. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.44.100, .125 (2000).
94. Tyner, 141 Wash. 2d at 95-96, 1 P.3d at 1163 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 96, 1 P.3d at 1163 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 98, 1 P.3d at 1164 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 98-99, 1 P.3d at 1164 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 96, 1 P.3d at 1163 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
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is "aware of the doctrine of implied statutory causes of action."99 The
Tyner dissenters believed Washington courts should continue to consider
the presence or absence of statutorily-defined procedural protections for
the plaintiff in deciding whether to find a cause of action for damages.' 0
Therefore, a court could consider all of these factors when determining
the existence of an implied private cause of action for damages under a
Washington statute.
III. WASHINGTON AND OTHER STATE COURTS HAVE
DENIED EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS FOR
BOTH LEGAL AND POLICY REASONS
State courts nationwide have almost uniformly denied educational
malpractice claims.0 ' Educational malpractice plaintiffs wishing to sue
under a state statute must first show that the legislature implied an
individual cause of action."02 Then, the plaintiff must show a workable
standard of care, a failure to meet that standard of care, a comprehensible
and assessable harm, and a causal connection between the school
district's failure and the resulting harm.0 3 Finally, a plaintiff must
overcome traditional policy concerns including hesitation to substitute
the court's judgment for that of school officials, reluctance to interfere
with the day-to-day workings of schools, and fear that a flood of
litigation could result.
99. Id. at 80, 1 P.3d at 1155 (quoting Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 919-920, 784 P.2d
1258, 1261 (1990) (quoting McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wash. 2d 265, 274, 621 P.2d 1285, 1290 (1980)
(Brachtenbach, J., dissenting.))).
100. Id. at 93, 1 P.3d at 1161 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
101. Only Montana has allowed a claim for educational malpractice to survive summary
judgment. See B.M. v. Montana, 649 P.2d 425, 427 (Mont. 1982) (holding that state owes duty of
care to child in testing and special education placement).
102. See, e.g., Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 52 Wash. App. 531, 762 P.2d 356 (1988); Camer v.
Brouillet, No. 10227-3-, slip op. (Wash. App. June 7, 1982).
103. These are the basic elements of a prima facie case of educational malpractice. However,
courts uniformly treat them as threshold policy barriers to establishing an implied cause of action.
See, eg., Peter NV. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Donohue
v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E. 2d 1352, 1353-54 (N.Y. 1979).
Washington Law Review
A. Washington Courts Have Denied Educational Malpractice Claims
Because Individual Student Plaintiffs Were Unable to Establish a
Private Cause ofAction
Student plaintiffs have twice attempted to establish an educational
malpractice cause of action under Washington statutes.10 4 Division One
of the Washington Court of Appeals denied both claims.0 5 In each case,
the court determined that the relevant statutes created no cause of action
or duty to individual students; thus, the court was wholly unwilling to
allow these educational malpractice claims to advance.0 6
1. The Court of Appeals Denied a Private Cause ofAction for
Educational Malpractice Because Plaintiffs Did Not Show They
Had an Individual Right to an Adequate Education
In Camer v. Brouillet,0 7 an unpublished case, plaintiffs sued on the
theory that the Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) had failed to
implement the Student Learning Objectives Law correctly.' 8 In applying
the legislative intent prong of the Cort test, the court recognized an
additional requirement for implying a private cause of action: the
plaintiffs must show legislative intent to create a school district duty
owed to individual students. 9 This requirement arose out of a
"traditional rule" that a statutorily imposed duty on public officials is
owed only to the public as a whole"0 except when the legislature shows
an intent to protect certain people."' Those people may bring an action in
tort for a violation of the statute.1
2
104. Corer, 52 Wash. App. at 532, 762 P 2d at 358; Brouillet, No. 10227-3-1, at 4.
105. Caner, 52 Wash. App. at 538, 762 P.2d at 360; Brouillet, No. 10227-3-1 at 5.
106. Caimer, 52 Wash. App. at 537, 762 P,2d at 360; Brouillet, No. 10227-3-1 at 5.
107. No. 10227-3-I, slip op. (Wash. App. June 7, 1982).
108. Id. at 2; cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.092 (1981).
109. Brouillet, No. 10227-3-1 at 4.
110. Id. (quoting Baerlein v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 229, 231, 595 P.2d 930, 931 (1979) (citing
Halverson v. Dahl, 89 Wash. 2d 673, 676, 574 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1978))). This traditional rule is also
called the "public duty doctrine." Kristi Anderson Bjomerud, Comment, The Uncertain Scope of
Sovereign Immunity in Washington After Savage v. State, 71 WASH. L. REv. 1069, 1074-75 (1996).
111. Bjomerud, supra note 110 at 1074-75.
112. Brouillet, No. 10227-3-1 at 4.
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To determine whether the statute in question created an individual
cause of action, the court examined legislative history." 3 The purpose of
the Student Learning Objectives Law was to promote efficient
management of quality education and guide student attainment of
objectives without consequences for individual students." 4 Accordingly,
the court reasoned that the language and legislative history were devoid
of any legislative intent to create a duty to individual students."' The
court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to establish an implied private cause
of action because the statutory duty was owed only to the general
public." 6
2. Plaintiffs Have Been Unable To Establish a Cause ofAction for
Educational Malpractice Based on Other Washington Education
Statutes
In Camer v. Seattle School District,"7 the court rejected an
educational malpractice claim based on an implied cause of action under
Washington statutes"' because the plaintiff could not meet the elements
of the Cort test and alternative administrative remedies were available." 9
At that time, one statute required students to study the Washington
Constitution as a prerequisite for high school graduation. 2 Another
mandated a one-semester course in state history and government.' The
Seattle School District had provided neither course of study to the
individual plaintiffs." In this pre-Bennett case, the court determined that
no private cause of action existed under these statutes."
113. Id. at 4-5.
114. Id. at4.
115. Id. Because the Broulet case was pre-Bennett, the court applied the Cort test without the
presumption that the legislature was aware of the doctrine of implied rights of action. Id.
116. Id. at 5; accord Peter W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 862 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976) (holding that statutory enactments were directed to attainment of optimal education results but
not safeguards against particular injury); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d
1352, 1353 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that state constitution provided general directive but was never
intended to impose duty flowing directly from local school district to individual pupils).
117. 52 Wash. App. 531,762 P.2d 356 (1988).
118. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.02.080, 28A.05.050 (1987).
119. Carner, 52 Wash. App. at 537-38,762 P.2d at 360.
120. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.02.080 (1987).
121. Id. § 28A.05.050.
122. See Carner, 52 Wash. App. at 536,762 P.2d at 360.
123. Id.
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The court used the federal Cort test to determine whether a private
cause of action existed that would allow students to sue when school
districts failed to provide statutorily-mandated courses. 24 The test was
identical to that applied later in Bennett, but it did not include the
presumption that the legislature was aware of the doctrine of implied
causes of action. 25 The court assumed, arguendo, that the legislature
enacted the statute for the special benefit of the plaintiffs." 6 However, the
court then concluded that the statutory language was devoid of any
express or implied legislative intent to create a private cause of action for
damages and that the student plaintiffs did not establish legislative intent
to the contrary through legislative history. 7 Finally, the court found that
an implied cause of action would not be consistent with the purposes of
the legislative scheme. 2 The court reasoned that the legislative purpose
was to establish general guidelines for producing the constitutionally-
mandated "ample" education.29  for Washington children, to be
administered within the discretion of local school districts. 3 °
In the course of its application of the Cort test, the court noted that the
administrative process provided a proper chain of accountability and that
administrative sanctions adequately eliminated a need for an individual
right of action.'' In addition, the legislature had limited judicial review
to persons who had been specifically aggrieved by a decision or order of
a school official or board.3 2 Therefore, existing administrative remedies
and legislative limitation of judicial review implied that an individual
cause of action for damages was inappropriate.
124. Id. at 536-37, 762 P.2d at 360 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 537, 762 P.2d at 360.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. See also supra Part I.A.
130. Camer, 52 Wash. App. at 537, 767 P.2d at 360.
131. See id. (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE 180-16-195(3) (1986)).
132. Id. The court cited WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.88.010 (1987), since amended and recodified as
WASH. REv. CODE § 28A.645.010 (2000). Although the amended statute permits citizens to appeal
school district decisions to Superior Court, the statute does not apply to tort claims because neither
school boards nor school district officials have authority to decide such claims. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 28A.645.010 (2000); Derrey v. Toppenish Sch. Dist., 69 Wash. App. 610, 615, 849 P.2d 699, 702
(1993).
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B. Early Cases in California and New York Provide Examples of Other
Legal and Policy Reasons Why Courts Have Denied Educational
Malpractice Claims
Two seminal educational malpractice cases illustrate other state
courts' reasons for barring implied private causes of action for
educational malpractice. In Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School
District,'33 a California high school graduate sued his school district
because he had been allowed to graduate from high school though he
could only read at a fifth-grade level.'34 However, the court found that
the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action based on either common law
negligence'35 or the California Code. 3 6 Likewise, in a New York case,
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District,'3 7 a graduate who was
unable to read sufficiently to complete an employment application sued
his school district under both the state constitution138 and common law
negligence.'39 Although the New York court was careful not to eliminate
the possibility that a properly argued educational malpractice claim could
survive, this particular claim was dismissed based on policy
considerations. 140
These seminal educational malpractice cases reveal a consistent set of
legal and policy concerns that an educational malpractice plaintiff must
overcome to establish a cause of action. 4' Courts have been unable to
create a definite standard of care for educators. They have recognized the
difficulty in proving a comprehensible and assessable educational harm
133. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
134. Id. at 856.
135. Id. at 861.
136. Id. at 862. The court rejected claims based on the California Code because, it reasoned, a
statute could impose liability only when it is designed to protect against a "particular kind of injury,"
and the court did not consider failure of educational achievement to be a particular injury under tort
law. Id. Also, the court determined that the statutes did not create a duty to individual students
because they were generally administrative and not protective of individuals. Id.
137. 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
138. Id. at 1353 ("The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free
common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated." (quoting N.Y. CONST. art.
XI, § 1)). The court dismissed the claim because this clause was intended as a "general directive" but
not intended to impose a duty "flowing directly from a local school district to individual pupils." Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1354.
141. Katherine Lush, Expanding the Rights of Children in Public Schools, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 95, 113-14 (2000).
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and have acknowledged that schools often are not solely to blame for a
student's failure to learn. Furthermore, policy concerns have included the
judiciary's hesitation to become involved in day-to-day school
administration, 42 its reluctance to interfere with the professional
judgment of administrators and educators, 43 and its unwillingness to
open a floodgate to costly litigation.' 41 Therefore, even if a Washington
plaintiff could establish an implied private cause of action for
educational malpractice under the AAA Statute pursuant to the Bennett
test, that student must also overcome these legal and policy barriers.
1. To Establish Educational Malpractice Claims, Plaintiffs Must Show
a Workable Standard of Care, a Concrete and Assessable Harm, and
a Causal Connection Between School Failure and the Student Harm
Courts have cited several legal reasons, although couched in public
policy terms, for denying educational malpractice causes of action. First,
courts have rejected educational malpractice claims based on the lack of
a workable standard of care. In Peter W., the court noted that the
challenged classroom methodology afforded no readily acceptable
standard to assess against the duty owed to students.'45 The court held
that there existed "no conceivable 'workability of a rule of care"' against
which the school's alleged misconduct could be measured, because a
variety of conflicting theories existed that suggest how or what a child
should be taught.146 However, the Donohue court noted that creation of a
standard by which to measure school performance would not pose an
"insurmountable obstacle."'
147
Courts also have found it very difficult to establish a comprehensible
or assessable educational harm. In Peter W., the court observed that on
occasions when courts have sanctioned new areas of tort liability, the
wrongs and injuries involved were both comprehensible and
assessable.'48 Peter W.'s claim that he had failed to achieve academically
142. Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354.
143. Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 52 Wash. App. 531, 537, 762 P.2d 356, 360 (1988).
144. Peter W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
145. Id. at 860-61.
146. Id. (quoting Raymond v. Paradise Unified Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (Cal. Ct. App.
1963)).
147. Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353.
148. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
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simply did not offer the concrete and assessable injury required.49 Thus,
the Peter W. court could not be certain that the plaintiff had suffered an
injury within the law of negligence."' Furthermore, though it did not
elaborate, the Camer court also believed that the children did not suffer
actual damage or injury when they could not take classes in Washington
government.'
Finally, courts have denied educational malpractice claims because
they have been concerned that inadequate instruction and student
promotion despite lack of skills are not the only causes for student
failure. The Peter W. court noted that "physical, neurological, emotional,
cultural, [or] environmental" factors could influence a child's learning,
such that no perceptible causal connection existed between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered.152 Still, the Donohue court
admitted that, although the causation element might be difficult to prove,
"it perhaps assumes too much to conclude that it could never be
established."'5
3
2. Public Policy Concerns Have Led Courts To Deny Educational
Malpractice Causes ofAction
Courts also have rejected educational malpractice claims based on
public policy concerns. Courts have been reluctant to allow a private
cause of action if the court must impose its own judgment on school
authorities or interfere with the everyday administration of a school by
determining which instructional practices or curricula are effective. The
Peter W. court emphasized that "pedagogy itself is fraught with different
and conflicting theories of how or what a child should be taught."' 54
Similarly, the Donohue court recognized that to entertain a cause of
action for educational malpractice, courts would not merely make broad
educational policy judgments, but more importantly, would also review
their day-to-day implementation.'55 This involvement would cause
blatant interference with the administration of the public school
149. Id.
150. Id. at 861.
151. Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 52 Wash. App. 531, 538, 762 P.2d 356, 360 (1988).
152. Peter W., 131 Cal Rptr. at 861.
153. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353-54 (N.Y. 1979).
154. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
155. Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354.
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system.156 Due to such concerns, the Camer court concluded that the
internal administrative review was the proper forum for the plaintiffs'
complaint. 57 Nevertheless, the Donohue court conceded that extreme
situations may exist where a court must intervene.158
Finally, courts have feared the possible flood of litigation that might
result from finding an implied private cause of action for damages based
on educational statutes. For example, the Peter W. court worried that
holding schools to an actionable duty of care when a student failed to
achieve would expose them to real or imagined tort claims of disaffected
students. 59 Parents and students "in countless numbers" might burden
school and society "beyond calculation.'
' 60
Legal and public policy issues have played a crucial role in denying
implied private rights of action for educational malpractice claims.
Washington courts have, and will likely continue to consider the barriers
set forth in these seminal educational malpractice cases. As a result, even
if a Washington plaintiff could establish an individual statutory private
cause of action for educational malpractice under the AAA Statute, that
student would also have to overcome these legal and policy barriers.
IV. WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD ALLOW EDUCATIONAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS FOR STUDENTS WHO MEET
LOCAL GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS BUT FAIL THE
WASL
Unfortunately, a large number of students in the class of 2008 are
likely to fail the tenth-grade Washington Assessment of Student
Learning (WASL).' 61 Some of these students will find that passing the
WASL is the only graduation requirement they cannot satisfy. These
students should be able to establish an implied private cause of action
against their school district for compensatory damages to pay for
remedial education. By applying the Bennett test to the Academic
156. Id.
157. Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 52 Wash. App. 531, 537, 762 P.2d 356, 360 (1988) ("Courts and
judges are normally not in a position to substitute their judgment for that of school authorities, nor
are we equipped to oversee and monitor day-to-day operations of a school system." (internal
citations omitted)).
158. Donohue, 391 N.E. 2d at 1354.
159. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Vol. 76:893, 2001
Educational Malpractice
Achievement and Accountability Statute (AAA Statute), these students
should be able to assert a private cause of action and also overcome the
traditional legal and public policy barriers to educational malpractice
claims.
A. Individual Students Who Fail the WASL Should Be Able To
Establish an Educational Malpractice Cause ofAction Under
Washington Law
Applying the Bennett v. Hardy62 test to the AAA Statute should imply
a cause of action because the legislature created the statute especially for
student benefit, 6 legislative history does not preclude an implied cause
of action for students,": and implying a private cause of action is
consistent with the underlying purpose of the AAA Statute: school
accountability. 6  Furthermore, the AAA statute provides no
administrative remedy for students who do not receive a diploma because
of their inability to pass the WASL and neither students nor parents have
any procedural rights under the statute that otherwise would protect
them.66 Consequently, students who satisfy all local graduation
requirements but cannot pass the WASL should have an implied private
cause of action against their school districts under the AAA Statute for
damages to pay for remedial education.167
1. Student Plaintiffs Should Be Able To Establish an Individual Cause
ofAction for Educational Malpractice by Applying the Bennett Test
to the AAA Statute
Students should be able to apply the Bennett test to the AAA Statute
to establish a cause of action. First, the purpose statement of the AAA
Statute reveals that the legislature created the statute for the special
benefit of Washington students. The purpose of Washington's
accountability system is to improve student learning so that each student
has the opportunity to develop the skills necessary to become a
162. 113 Wash. 2d 912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990).
163. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.005 (2000).
164. See supra Parts I.B., I.C.
165. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.005.
166. See id. § 28A.655.060(3)(c).
167. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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responsible and successful citizen. 168 The legislature also declared that
the accountability system should be based on "a fundamental
principle"'69 that all public school students have access to curriculum and
instruction that is aligned to state standards. 7° This intent to benefit
individual students through the development of specific skills was
notably absent in the statute requiring Washington government
coursework, on which the plaintiffs relied in Camer v. Seattle School
District No. 1.17' The legislature intended the AAA Statute to especially
benefit individual students, so the statute should satisfy the first prong of
the Bennett test.
Second, the legislative intent behind the AAA Statute does not
expressly preclude an individual implied cause of action for students. As
established in Tyner v. Department of Social and Health Services,72
when a statute and its legislative history are silent on this point,
Washington courts presume that the legislature is aware of the doctrine
of implied causes of action.77 Like the Child Abuse Statute in Tyner,174
there is no mention in the AAA Statute's legislative history of either
allowing or precluding a private cause of action for damages for
educational malpractice. Unlike the pre-Bennett cases, Brouillet'75 and
Camer, 7 6 when a current court interprets the AAA Statute, the
legislature's silence raises a presumption that it did not intend to
preclude private causes of action for students. Furthermore, Washington
courts should find that the AAA Statute creates a school district duty to
educate individual students adequately because the avowed purpose of
the AAA Statute is to create a school accountability system, ensuring that
both individual students and schools meet state standards. 77 A student
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.005.
169. Id.
170. See id. § 28A.150.210; see also Essential Academic Learning Requirements, at
http://wwv.kl2.wa.us/reform/EALR/standards/ealrshort.asp (last visited July 31, 2001).
171. 52 Wash. App. 531, 762 P.2d 356 (1988); see also WASH. REv. CODE §§ 28A.02.080,
28A.05.050 (1987).
172. 141 Wash. 2d 68, 1 P.3d 1148 (2000).
173. Id. at 80, 1 P.3d at 1155 (quoting Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 919-20, 784 P.2d
1258, 1261 (1990) (quoting McNeal v. Allen. 95 Wash. 2d 262, 274, 621 P.2d 1285, 1290 (1980)
(Brachtenbach, J., dissenting))).
174. Id.
175. Camer v. Brouillet, No. 10227-3-1, slip op. (Wash. App. June 7, 1982).
176. Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 52 Wash.App. 531, 762 P.2d 356 (1988).
177. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.005 (2000).
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right to an adequate education does not appear to arise from the
Washington Constitution. However, a student right to an education that
meets state standards logically follows from the AAA statutory duty just
as the "paramount duty' 178 to provide for a system of public schools
created a "correlative" student right to a public education.'79 Thus, a
court could infer, as it did in Tyner, that the legislature recognized that an
individual cause of action could protect this right.
Third, the underlying purpose of the AAA Statute supports the
establishment of a student's implied cause of action for educational
malpractice. The legislature enacted the AAA Statute as an attempt at
education reform through school accountability. 80  The entire
accountability system emphasizes the importance of school district
responsibility for the quality of education that it provides for each
student.' This emphasis on school accountability to benefit individual
students through the development of specific skills did not underlie the
statutes mandating Washington government coursework on which the
Camer plaintiffs depended.' Nor did this emphasis inspire the Student
Learning Objectives Law on which the Brouillet plaintiffs relied.' In
contrast, the AAA Statute's underlying emphasis on school
accountability for individual student skill level logically supports school
accountability to individual students through implied individual causes of
action, thereby satisfying the third prong of the Bennett test.
Accordingly, individual student plaintiffs who are unable to pass the
WASL but would otherwise receive a diploma based on local graduation
requirements should meet all three prongs of the Bennett test.
2. Under the AAA Statute, School Districts Have a Duty To Educate
Individual Students to WASL Standards
The school district's duty to provide an education adequate to meet
state standards does not merely extend to the general public like the
178. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
179. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 482, 585 P.2d 71, 76 (1978). Even if a school
district were to argue that its duty is to the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the A+
Commission, Tyner revealed that Washington courts are willing to recognize duties to more than one
entity within a single statute. Tyner, 141 Wash. 2d at 79, 1 P.3d at 1154; see also infra Part IV.A.2.
180. See supra Part I.C.
181. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.655.005, .035, .060(1), .060(3)(c), .060(3)(i) (2000).
182. See id. §§ 28A.02.080, 28A.05.050 (1987).
183. See id. §§ 28A.58.090, .092, .750 (1981).
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Student Learning Objectives Law in Brouillet.'84 It extends also to
individual students. The essential academic learning requirements,
referenced throughout the AAA Statute, are based on student learning
goals that focus on specific, individual abilities that each school district
must achieve for "all students.' 85 In addition, the statute was created to
ensure that "each individual student will be given the opportunity to
become a responsible citizen and successfully live, learn, and work in the
twenty-first century."' 86 Furthermore, the legislature declared a
fundamental principle that "all public school students" have access to
educational opportunities that are aligned with the standards. 8 7 Finally,
the legislature created a very individual consequence when it decided to
make the WASL a high-stakes test by denying a diploma to a student
who fails, 88 indicating the legislature intended that each student should
be educated to a level such that he or she can pass the WASL.
Early Washington educational malpractice cases should not deter a
court from finding that the AAA Statute creates an individual implied
cause of action. The plaintiffs in Camer and Brouillet did not suffer an
individual consequence like the loss of a diploma.'89 Furthermore, the
constitutional duty to provide ample education discussed in Camer is far
more general than the particular statutory duty to educate individual
students adequately for them to pass the WASL.9 0 In addition, this case
can be distinguished from Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School
District, ' in which the court called California's education statutes
generally "administrative" but not "protective" of individuals because
they did not safeguard against an individual injury of any kind.'92 Unlike
the plaintiff in Peter W., a Washington child would suffer an individual,
concrete, and easily proven harm if denied a diploma. Furthermore, the
language of the AAA statute is more focused on results for individual
184. Camer v. Brouillet, No. 10227-3-1, slip op. at 4-5 (Wash. App. June 7, 1982).
185. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.210 (2000).
186. Id. § 28A.655.005 (emphasis added).
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. Id. § 28A.655.060(3)(c).
189. See Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 52 Wash. App. 531, 532-33, 762 P.2d 356, 358 (1988);
Brouillet, No. 10227-3-I at 2.
190. Compare supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text with supra notes 184-188 and
accompanying text.
191. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
192. Id. at 862. This holding rested on the court's characterization of harm as a student's failure to
achieve academically. Id.
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students than the clause of the New York constitution studied in
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District.93 The AAA Statute is
distinguishable from earlier bases for student claims because it focuses
on the individual student. As a result, Washington courts should find that
the school district's duty to educate adequately extends to the individual
student.
A school district might contend that its only duty under the AAA
Statute is to provide an opportunity for students to achieve all of the
essential academic learning requirements.'94 From this perspective, the
WASL merely measures whether the student has absorbed and can
reiterate the information taught. If a child fails the WASL, the school
might argue that the student failed to learn the required materials even
though the school fulfilled its duty by adequately providing an
opportunity to learn those materials.' 95 However, a student could reply
that her ability to achieve all local graduation requirements reflects that
she either mastered, to the satisfaction of the school district, the skills
actually taught, or that the school district allowed her to pass despite a
lack of skill. In either case, the school district should be responsible
under the AAA Statute for failing to develop the student's individual
abilities adequately for her to pass the WASL. 96
3. Because the AAA Statute Offers Neither Alternative Remedies Nor
Procedural Protections to Students, an Implied Cause ofAction for
Educational Malpractice Should Exist
Neither administrative remedies nor statutorily defined procedural
protections would preclude an educational malpractice claim based on an
implied private cause of action under the AAA Statute. While the
majority did not address alternative remedies in Tyner, the Camer court
mentioned the existence of administrative remedies as a reason for
denying a cause of action in Washington courts.'97  The A+
Commission's recommended intervention strategies do not include
193. 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
194. See supra note 37.
195. The Fifth Circuit has held that competency exams resulting in diploma sanctions must fairly
reflect what is taught. Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 403-06 (5th Cir. 1981). However, no
federal or state court has imposed this restriction in Washington.
196. See Arthur L. Coleman, Excellence and Equity in Education: High Standards forigh-Stakes
Tests, 6 VA. J. SOC- POL'Y & L 81, 84 (1998).
197. Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist, 52 Wash. App. 531, 537, 762 P.2d 356, 360 (1988).
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administrative remedies for students who have completed all local
graduation requirements but have been denied a diploma.'98 The AAA
Statute requires the A+ Commission to create a system to intervene in
schools and school districts in which significant numbers of students
persistently fail to meet WASL standards.199 Yet unlike Camer, in which
a positive administrative ruling requiring Washington government
courses might benefit one of the Camer children, 00 any administrative
action intended to improve a school district would not help a student who
had already been denied a diploma.2"' Even if a school were to improve,
the remedy would simply be too late; it could not impact a student who
no longer attends the school.20 2
Additionally, the Tyner dissent relied heavily on the fact that
procedural protections were defined in the Child Abuse Statute.0 3 Even
though the dissent argued that adequate procedural rights provided to
children or parents in a statute might preclude the finding of an implied
cause of action,0 4 neither the AAA Statute nor the A+ Commission
provides specific procedural protections for individual students0 . like
those for accused abusers in the Child Abuse Statute.2"6 Furthermore, in
Tyner, accused parents like the plaintiff were not intended to be the
primary beneficiaries of the Child Abuse Statute, but merely secondary
198. WASHINGTON STATE ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY COMMISSION, supra
note 52, at 5.
199. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.060(3)(i)(iii) (2000).
200 Camer, 52 Wash App. at 537, 762 P.2d at 360.
201. Even though the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction has acknowledged that it
will provide remedial educational services to eleventh and twelfth-grade students who initially fail
the tenth-grade WASL, those remedial services do not extend to students whose graduation date has
passed. Telephone Interview with Rosemary Fitton, Coordinator for Special Projects, Office of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction (Apr. 3, 2001)
202. No one has suggested that a school improved by the AAA system would invite deprived
students to return to receive an improved education. Telephone Interview with Rosemary Fitton,
Coordinator for Special Projects, Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction (Apr. 3, 2001).
203. Tyner v. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 141 Wash. 2d 68, 93, 1 P.3d 1148, 1161
(2000) (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
204. See id.
205. Although the "Accountability Policies" section of the AAA Statute mentions that the A+
Commission must consider procedural issues in its deliberations, this section specifically deals with
state strategies for intervening in failing schools and school districts. See WASH. REV. CODE
28A.655 035(l)(c) (2000). Therefore, it is likely that the procedural considerations mentioned here
would apply to institutional intervention into schools and not to individual students.
206. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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beneficiaries within the hierarchy of interests.7 However, the legislature
explicitly intended students to be the primary beneficiaries of the AAA
Statute,"' making an even stronger case that the legislature intended to
protect students by allowing tort remedies. Thus, because no statutorily-
defined procedural rights exist for students, the primary beneficiaries of
the AAA statute, a court should not allow an argument like the one
proposed by the Tyner dissent to prevent students from seeking
compensatory damages for remedial education.20 9
B. A Student ho Has Satisfied All Local Graduation Requirements
Should Overcome Legal and Policy Barriers to Establishing a
Cause ofAction for Educational Malpractice
An individual student who has met all local graduation requirements
but has failed to pass the WASL should overcome traditional legal and
policy barriers to educational malpractice claims. The AAA Statute
creates a standard of care against which courts can measure school
performance. Additionally, a denied diploma is a concrete and assessable
harm, and a student who has met all local graduation requirements can
show a causal connection between the denied diploma and the school
district's failure to educate adequately. Furthermore, WASL scores could
prevent the court from having to interfere with the judgment of
administrators because they provide a reliable measure of school
performance. Finally, a court could impose limitations that would
alleviate concern that a flood of litigation might result.
1. A Student Who Has Met All Local Requirements Could Establish a
Standard of Care, a Concrete Harm, and a Causal Connection
Between School Failure and the Denied Diploma
A student who has completed all local requirements could show all of
the elements necessary to establish an educational malpractice claim. The
207. Tyner, 141 Wash. 2d at 92-93, 1 P.3d at 1161 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
208. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.005.
209. One author has suggested protections to eliminate the risk of inappropriately denying post-
graduation opportunities based on test scores. These protections include: (1) establishing
compensatory supports to ensure adequate opportunities to master tested materials, (2) providing
multiple opportunities to take the test, and (3) considering academic factors other than test scores
that may affirm or challenge high stakes conclusions derived from test scores. Coleman, supra note
196, at 109-10.
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Donohue court admitted that a court might create a standard of care,10
but in Washington the court need not do so because the legislature has
concluded that the WASL is a workable standard.2 ' The WASL sets a
measurable standard of care by reliably assessing a student's mastery of
the essential academic learning requirements. 2 The state itself relies on
the WASL to determine the adequacy of the education provided by
school districts, establishing the WASL's validity as an assessment
tool.213 A Washington student who has met all local graduation
requirements could present failing WASL scores, indicating the school's
failure to adequately educate to a level mandated by statewide standards.
Unlike the plaintiff in Peter W., a Washington student would not have to
establish a "correct" pedagogy against which the court would measure
the school district's performance1 4 because the school district's failure,
as defined by the legislature, would be evident in the student's failing
WASL scores.
An assessable educational harm will exist when a student does not
pass the tenth-grade WASL and therefore does not graduate. The harm of
not receiving a high school diploma places a student at a serious
disadvantage for future employment opportunities.1 5 Individuals with
high school diplomas make as much as nineteen percent more per hour
than those without.21 6 This harm has a more concrete and provable
impact than either the failure to achieve academically, claimed in Peter
., or the failure to learn about Washington government, claimed in
Camer.21 ' Accordingly, a student who is denied a diploma based solely
on his or her WASL scores should be able to establish a concrete and
assessable harm sufficient to overcome this legal barrier.
Courts have resisted recognizing an implied statutory cause of action
for educational malpractice out of concerns that inadequate education is
210. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353 (N.Y. 1979).
211. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.035(1)(b)(i).
212. Id. § 28A.655.030(1)(b).
213. Id. § 28A.655.035(1)(b)(i).
214. See Peter W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
215. Jamie M. McCall, Now Pinch Hitting for Educational Reform: Delaware's Minimum
Competency Test and the Diploma Sanction, 18 J.L. & COM 373, 380 (1999).
216. Id. Courts have recognized the impact of a failure to graduate by declaring a property interest
in a high school diploma. See, eg., Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 403 (5th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975)).
217. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
218. Camer v Seattle Sch Dist., 52 Wash. App. 531, 536, 762 P.2d 356, 359-60 (1988).
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not the only cause for student failure.219 However, as the Donohue court
noted, causation in an educational malpractice case is not impossible to
prove." Because a student could satisfy all local graduation
requirements, the court could be certain that one of two things has
happened. In one instance, the student will have passed all local
graduation requirements despite "physical, neurological, emotional,
cultural, [and] environmental" factors,"' thus impugning the school's
inadequate instruction. Alternatively, the school district will have
allowed the student to pass local requirements, despite a lack of skill,
without remedial or special education assistance geared toward the
WASL. In either case, the school district will be responsible for the
student's failure to learn, maldng compensatory damages for remedial
education appropriate.
A court could also alleviate the causation dilemma by allowing the
"substantial factor" test to prevail.'m That is, if a court, like the Peter W.
court, feels that both school and external factors have caused the
student's failure, the court could determine that "'two causes concur to
bring about an event and either one of them operating alone could have
been sufficient to cause the result.""'t A school district could then be
found fully liable for compensatory damages for remedial education
because the school district was a "substantial factor" in a child's
educational injury, even if a school district was not the most significant
or sole cause. 4 Accordingly, the legal concern that a student would be
unable to show causation should not preclude Washington courts from
allowing students to establish an implied cause of action under the AAA
Statute.z
219. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
220. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353-54 (N.Y. 1979).
221. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
222. Albert C. Jurenas, Will Educational Malpractice Be Revived?, 74 WEST EDUCATION LAW
REPORTER 449, 454-55 (1992).
223. Id. at 455 (quoting Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 876 (Cal. 1991) (quoting Thomsen v.
Rexall Drug & Chemical Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 642, 647 (1965))).
224. Id.
225. Additionally, Washington follows a rule of comparative negligence, allowing juries to
allocate responsibility for an injury between the plaintiff and the defendant. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.22.005 (2000). Therefore, a court or jury could attribute fault fairly between the student and the
school district. See also 6 HON. GEORGE T. SHIELDS, WASH. PATrERN INSTRUCrIONS, in
WASHINGTON PRACTICE 106-07 (1989) ("[R]educe the total damages you find to have been
sustained by the plaintiff, by the percentage of [plaintiff's] contributory negligence.").
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School districts may also hypothesize that two students could receive
an identical education, even sitting next to each other in every class
throughout the students' educational careers. If one student can pass the
WASL and the other cannot, how can the district be blamed for
inadequate education? However, in using the WASL tests to evaluate
school performance, the Washington State Legislature has acknowledged
that school districts carry some responsibility for actual student learning,
not merely teacher output of information.22 This responsibility includes
preparing students with both the substantive and exam-taking skills to
complete the tenth-grade WASL successfully. The most basic obligation
of educators is to meet the needs of students as they find them,
accounting for their varying backgrounds and abilities.227 Under the
affirmative legislative mandates and duties of the AAA Statute, school
districts cannot skirt their responsibility to educate each child simply by
lamenting learning differences.
2. A Student Who Meets Local Graduation Requirements Should Also
Be Able To Overcome Traditional Public Policy Concerns That
Have Led Courts To Deny Educational Malpractice Claims
A student who has passed all local graduation requirements but failed
the WASL and who seeks compensatory damages for remedial education
should be able to overcome traditional public policy concerns. In
allowing an implied private cause of action for educational malpractice
under the AAA statute, a court would not have to substitute its judgment
for that of school authonties218 or interfere with the everyday workings of
school administrators. Because the A+ Commission and the legislature
are both willing to make evaluative decisions based on the objective
2291 holWASL assessment system, courts should not hesitate to rely on that
system as a measure of both individual student mastery of the essential
academic learning requirements and overall school performance. Unlike
the Peter W. and Donohue courts, Washington courts would not have to
prescribe specific pedagogy because the AAA Statute and the WASL
provide a standard against which to measure school performance. Courts
would simply be insisting that school districts meet those standards
226. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
227. Coleman, supra note 196, at 84.
228. See Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 52 Wash. App. 531, 537, 762 P.2d 356, 360 (1988).
229. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.655.035(1)(b)(i) (2000).
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imposed by the legislature. 2" Therefore, courts would not need to
substitute their judgment for that of school authorities.
Furthermore, Washington courts would not have to interfere with
everyday school administration because the plaintiff would already be
outside the school system. Presumably, the AAA Statute's accountability
system should continue to reform the day-to-day workings of schools."
Relief could be limited to compensatory damages for remedial education
and would be appropriate only when the accountability system had not
yet succeeded in a specific school district. A court could limit damages
even further by insisting that the school district pay fees directly to the
institution 2 where the child would attend remediation courses. While an
implied private cause of action would encourage school districts to
reform a failing school quickly, a private remedy for students already
outside the school system would in no way require the court to dictate
exactly how a district should improve its failing school. A cause of
action would simply provide a separate remedial scheme that would
avoid the problems anticipated by the Donohue and Camer courts. 23
Finally, courts have been concerned with the flood of litigation that
could result from an implied cause of action for educational malpractice.
Presumably, a Washington court would be just as reluctant as the Peter
W. court to allow recovery for a student's lost employment opportunities
resulting from an inadequate education."4 However, awarding only costs
of compensatory education would offer a fair remedy that would not
unreasonably burden school districts. Thus, by limiting damages to
funding for compensatory education, courts would reduce the number of
plaintiffs willing to sue. Disaffected students who solely sought
retaliation against their districts would have no motivation to sue unless
they actually wished to meet WASL standards. Furthermore, only
230 In other contexts, courts have relied on test scores to make conclusions that the court could
not reach without outside evaluation See Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F. Supp 1481, 1497 (E.D. Wash.
1994) (using test scores to determine extent that student's diminished performance was result of
automobile accident). In addition, one commentator has suggested that educational malpractice
claims should follow medical and legal malpractice standards: courts should accept evidence from
experts in the profession to prove causation and harm. Lush, supra note 141, at 112.
231 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
232. Washington State's community college system might be an appropriate setting for a
remediation program Although some might suggest that the public school system could provide
post-twelfth grade remediation, it is important to remember that the court is providing the remedy
because the school has failed in its duty to adequately educate.
233. See supra notes 154-158 and accompanying text.
234. See Peter W. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr 854, 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
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students who could satisfy all other graduation requirements would be
able make out an educational malpractice cause of action. Therefore, the
causation requirement itself could limit the number of students who
could successfully bring the implied cause of action.
Finally, though the graduation requirement does not take effect until
2008, if WASL test scores do not improve significantly before that
deadline, there may be a large number of students who could claim that
the school district caused their failure. This Comment demonstrates the
type of liability that a school district could face if it fails to solve this
problem before 2008. School districts might begin to alleviate the
problem by insisting that teachers honestly assess a student's abilities
when determining passing or failing grades for a particular course.
Furthermore, if the number of students who satisfy local requirements far
exceeds the number who can pass the WASL, the Superintendent of
Public Instruction may want to reconsider the standards or provide for
multiple alternative methods of assessment. 35
V. CONCLUSION
In Washington State, the legislature has shown dedication to
improving the skill level of Washington students by introducing a new
and innovative school accountability system. As part of this system, the
legislature has chosen to deny high school diplomas to students who
cannot pass a statewide assessment test. Unfortunately, students often are
not solely to blame for their failure. The need for school accountability
necessarily acknowledges that many schools fail to educate their students
adequately. Therefore, students should be able to seek the only remedy
that will do them any good: compensatory damages from their school
district for remedial education.
These students should be able to achieve this goal by establishing an
implied private cause of action for educational malpractice under the
AAA Statute, which is responsible for creating the WASL assessment
and accountability system. The AAA Statute expresses a clear school
district duty to individual students while insisting on school
accountability. The Washington Supreme Court applies the Bennett test
to determine the existence of an implied private cause of action. Also, a
denied diploma is a very concrete and individual harm that cannot be
remedied by later school improvement. Thus, the unique convergence of
235. See supra note 211.
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the AAA statute, the Bennett test, and the absence of insurmountable
legal or policy barriers should allow a student to successfully sue his or
her school district for damages to fund a remedial education.
926
